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THE EQUILIBRIUM OF VIOLENCE: 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE AGE OF AUTONOMOUS 
WEAPONS SYSTEMS 
 
Joel Hood* 
 
 
 
 
 
History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the 
price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must 
be strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could 
bring no benefit, only disaster. So, when we neglected our defenses, the 
risks of serious confrontation grew. 
Ronald Reagan1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Emerging technologies have tested the tenuous balance between the 
law of armed conflict, principles of humanity, and military necessity. 
Modern autonomous weapons systems are no exception.2 Some argue 
that there is no acceptable equilibrium for these weapons systems and 
that they should be prohibited as a matter of international law.3 This 
situation is not without parallel. New technologies like aircraft, 
submarines, and asphyxiating gas fundamentally changed the nature of 
warfare in the years leading up to World War I and ultimately resulted in 
changes to the law of armed conflict (LOAC), but not until the new 
weapons systems had been used with terrible effect. These historical 
examples highlight the importance of emerging law and its need to keep 
pace with technological advancement. This paper argues that current 
LOAC provisions—with specific focus on Additional Protocol I art. 
                                                        
* 2nd Lieutenant United States Marine Corps; J.D. Candidate 2015, J. Reuben Clark Law 
School. The author would like to thank Professor Eric Jensen, J. Reuben Clark Law School for his 
mentorship and guidance through the research, writing, and publishing process. 
1  Ronald Reagan, President, United States of America, Address to the Nation and Other 
Countries on United States-Soviet Relations (January 16, 1984), available at 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1984/11684a.htm. 
2 Many people likely associate autonomous weapons with “drones”—unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAV)—due to their high-profile in the ongoing war on international terror networks. However, 
autonomous weapons operate with much less human interaction and include weapons systems like: 
the Iron Dome Defense system, Aegis and Patriot missile systems, and unmanned border turrets. 
3 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS 29 (2012) 
[hereinafter LOSING HUMANITY]. Human Rights Watch has asserted that there should be a 
worldwide ban on “killer robots” autonomous weapons. Law-of-armed-conflict scholar Michael 
Schmitt contends that these weapons systems are not per se illegal but rather, like almost all 
weapons, they can be employed in an impermissible manner. See Michael N. Schmitt, Autonomous 
Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the Critics (HARVARD NATIONAL 
SECURITY JOURNAL FEATURE 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2184826. 
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36 4 —are anticipatory of new technology and make a repetition of 
history, particularly weapons systems abuse, unlikely. This paper 
explores this assertion by employing economic terms to understand what 
I term “the equilibrium of violence.” 
Consider this basic economics question: what is the effect of a tax on 
the domestic market for cigarettes? Often, this kind of tax is called a “sin 
tax” because it taxes a social ill. The rationale is that smoking has serious 
negative spillover effects on non-smokers, e.g., side effects of 
secondhand smoke. This spillover, or negative externality, means that 
suppliers and smokers are not internalizing the effects of smoking; in 
other words, they are not paying enough to offset the damage they cause 
to the health of other people. The tax on each pack of cigarettes raises the 
overall price the consumer pays at the store, as seen in the graph below: 
 
 
 
The point on the graph at Q0,P0 represents the market equilibrium as 
determined by supply and demand without government interference. The 
point Q1, P1 represents the new, artificial equilibrium point after the tax 
is imposed. At this point the tax achieves its goal of reducing the quantity 
of cigarettes demanded (conditional on the elasticity of demand for 
cigarettes) by raising the price. The shaded triangle traditionally 
represents the market inefficiency, or deadweight loss, created by the 
imposition of the tax. However, in this example of a tax attempting to 
compensate for a negative externality, it is a gain to society. 
Now, instead of a tax, imagine that the government issued new laws 
on the ingredients of cigarettes, cigarette packaging, and where people 
can smoke. These laws impose real costs on the producer, who then                                                         
4 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter AP I]. 
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passes those costs onto the consumer. They raise costs and lower the 
quantity demanded. Thus, laws can have the same effect as a direct tax. 
State-level production of violence is similar. Like cigarettes, state-level 
violence is a social and global ill. Unlike cigarettes, violence cannot be 
taxed directly. However, the obligations the LOAC imposes on state 
actors are real costs and can have the same effect as a direct tax, thus 
increasing the price state actor must pay to engage in violence and 
simultaneously reducing the quantity of violence produced in the 
international arena.  
But what happens when new military technology emerges? New 
technology (in macroeconomic terms) shifts the entity’s production 
possibilities frontier out—enabling it to produce more. Think, for 
example, of the cotton gin, the computer, and in our case, autonomous 
weapons systems. Autonomous weapons systems increase the ability of 
state actors to produce violence. Thus, the emergence of new military 
technology has the potential to destabilize the equilibrium that the legal 
regime has crafted and overproduce violence. The following graph 
displays this dynamic: 
 
Point Q0, C0 represents the artificial equilibrium of violence 
maintained by the international legal regime. Supply shifts out as 
represented by the arrow from S0 to S1, and a new equilibrium point 
results at Q1, C1. You will notice that at this point the quantity of 
violence produced is greater and the cost of violence is lower. This is not 
an optimal outcome. However, Additional Protocol I article 36 acts as a 
tax on future weapons systems, meant to counterbalance the negative 
externalities that result from emerging autonomous weapons systems. 
Thus, the equilibrium of violence in the international market will likely 
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be maintained, and Human Rights Watch’s assertion that there must be a 
ban on “killer robots” 5 is unnecessary.  
Part II is a brief history of technology and LOAC regarding aerial 
vehicles, submarines, and asphyxiating gas in the early 20th century. 
These historical examples show that the international community’s 
efforts pre-World War I and in the interwar period did not sufficiently 
“tax” new technologies and the result was an excess of violence in war.  
Part III gives a snapshot of current autonomous weapons systems. It 
also presents the current state of the LOAC that applies to these 
weapons. Part IV compares the historical examples from Part II and the 
contemporary issues in Part III and determines that the LOAC is 
fundamentally different today than it was at the turn of the 20th century.  
Part V explains how today’s LOAC is superior and can effectively 
control the inevitable use of autonomous weapons. The LOAC has this 
ability because it treats new technology that has the potential for greater 
violence as a negative externality and has provisions and the ability to 
regulate it. Part VI consists of recommendations, and Part VII is a 
conclusion. 
 
II. A LESSON FROM HISTORY: LOAC IN THE EARLY 20TH CENTURY 
 
A. Technology 
 
Many technological advances were made in the period immediately 
preceding World War I. Telford Taylor, Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, 
explained: “The airplane, the submarine, and poison gas had profoundly 
affected the conduct of war” and were “largely untouched by the Hague 
Conventions” of 1899 and 1907.6 Each of these new weapons tested the 
nascent law of armed conflict. Delegates to both Hague Conferences 
instituted a total prohibition on gas warfare, a temporary prohibition on 
aerial vehicles, but nearly no specific guidance on submarines. The 
reactions and remedies to those technologies mirror reactions to 
autonomous weapons systems today. In the early 20th century, as now, 
there have been those that have called for the per se illegality of new 
technologies.7 However, some of those innovations, like the airplane and 
submarine, have become part of conventional warfare while others, like 
asphyxiating gas, continue to be prohibited by treaty and customary 
international law.8                                                         
5 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 3. 
6 TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 18 (1992). Surprisingly, 
aerial bombardment, submarines, and poison gas received a great deal of treatment in both of these 
early Hague Conferences but resulted in relatively feeble treaty provisions. 
7 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 3; PROCEEDINGS OF THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE OF 
1930 73–4, DEPARTMENT OF STATE CONFERENCE SERIES, no. 4 (1931) [Hereinafter LONDON 
CONFERENCE OF 1930]; PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1899 299 (James B. 
Scott ed., 1920) [hereinafter HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1899]. 
8 Major Joseph Burns Kelly, Gas Warfare in International Law, 9 MIL. L. REV. 1, 21–22 
(1960). 
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1. Submarines 
 
Submarines were first used on a wide scale in World War I,9 and 
were relatively slow and could not keep pace with surface ships.10 The 
Hague Convention of 1907 governed some aspects of submarine warfare, 
such as the laying of automatic contact mines.11 However, the temptation 
to leverage the submarine’s primary strength, concealment, proved too 
great a temptation for the German Navy. It began unrestricted submarine 
warfare in 1915 and again in 1917.12 German unrestricted submarine 
warfare led to the sinking of the RMS Lusitania in 1915, which prompted 
the United States’ entrance into World War I.13 
In 1917, Germany declared the area surrounding the British Isles a 
war zone into which merchant vessels entered at their own peril. This 
economic warfare at sea attempted to both deny the enemy material and 
to starve the enemy into submission.14 In fact, “[n]either side denied 
using starvation as a method of warfare.” 15  Consequently, there was 
widespread humanitarian and governmental outcry against submarine 
warfare.16 Perhaps one of the most egregious violations of the law of war 
by use of unrestricted submarine warfare was the sinking of a British 
hospital ship and the destruction of both lifeboats and survivors.17  
 
2. Aerial Vehicles 
 
The use of aerial vehicles during wartime was first discussed in the 
late 1800’s: “The use of dirigible airships had been discussed in 
international conferences in Chicago in 1893 and Paris in 1899.”18 In the 
preceding decades states had used balloons as spotters for artillery and 
for aerial bombardment.19 However, their usefulness was limited.20 As 
one of the United States’ delegates to the 1899 Hague Conference, 
Captain Crozier, stated, “[I]t can carry but little; it is capable of hurling, 
only on points exactly determined and over which it may pass by chance,                                                         
9  Submarine Chronology, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS SUBMARINE WARFARE DIVISION, 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/history/chrono.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). 
10 Id. 
11 PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1907 VOL. I 643 (James B. Scott ed., 
1920) [hereinafter HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1907]. 
12 TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 18 
13  Topics in Chronicling America - Sinking of the Lusitania, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/news/topics/lusitania.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). 
14Lieutenant David A. Melson, Targeting War-Sustaining Capability at Sea: Compatibility 
with Additional Protocol I, ARMY LAW., July 2009, at 44, 47. 
15 Id. at 47. 
16 TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 18. 
17 Id. at 17. Lieutenant Patzig and his subordinate officers, Lieutenants Dithmar and Boldt, 
were charged in the Leipzig Trials, but Patzig fled the country and, although convicted, Dithmar and 
Boldt escaped from prison after only a few months. 
18 W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 10 (1990). 
19 Id. at 10. 
20 Id. 
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indecisive quantities of explosives, which would fall, like useless 
hailstones, on both combatants and non-combatants alike.”21 
Aerial warfare changed dramatically starting in 1903 when the Wright 
brothers made the first sustained, powered heavier-than-air flight.22 As 
the Wrights, Santos-Dumont, and other aviation pioneers perfected their 
designs, states looked to their military applications. 23  The dirigible 
changed the quantities of explosives that an airborne vessel could carry. 
Certainly, no one in London in 1915 argued that the bombs descending 
from German dirigibles were “like useless hailstones.”24 Rather, “by the 
end of the year over 200 civilians had been killed and many were 
terrorized.”25 The deliberate targeting of steel and munitions factories by 
both sides of the conflict demoralized the enemy “consistent with the 
theory of collateral casualties.”26 
 
3. Asphyxiating Gas 
 
“At 5 p.m. on 22 April 1915 a thick yellow smoke was seen to bellow 
up from the German trenches between Langemarck and Bixschoute near 
Ypres, Belgium.”27 This was the first use of modern chemical warfare. 
“Soon a gas wall of chlorine two miles long and a hundred feet high 
began to drift toward the French positions at Langemarck.” 28  Five 
thousand soldiers died as a result of that first attack.29 During the course 
of the year, the Germans, followed by the French and the British, 
continued to use gas clouds in an effort to break the lines of the 
entrenched enemy. 30 In 1917, artillery shells containing gas began to 
compliment the yellow clouds of chlorine and the smell of old hay that 
accompanied phosgene.31 By the end of the war phosgene would account 
for 80% of all military personnel gas deaths.32  
The German forces first used mustard gas on July 12, 1917.33 It was 
much more effective than other gases producing eight times as many 
casualties.34 Its main advantage was its persistence and potency. Contact 
with the skin produced blisters and it could remain on the ground for 
days after the attack. It became the chemical weapon of choice                                                         
21 Id. at 11. 
22 Parks, supra note 18, at 16. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 12. 
26 Parks, supra note 18, at 22. 
27 Major Kelly, supra note 8, at 3. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 6. 
30 Id. at 8, 9. 
31 Id. at 9; see also United States Army WWII Poster, NATIONAL MUSEUM OF HEALTH AND 
MEDICINE, http://www.medicalmuseum.mil/assets/images/galleries/world_war_II/phosgene.jpg. 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2014). 
32 Major Kelly, supra note 8, at 11. 
33 Id. at 10. 
34 Id. at 10–11 
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throughout that year and into the next.35 The last gas was an American 
invention—lewisite.36 Whereas chlorine gas caused many casualties but 
few deaths, lewisite was potent enough to “penetrate the pores and 
poison the body.”37 While each of the aforementioned gases were grisly 
in their effects and placed enormous numbers of soldiers hors de combat, 
 
[I]t must be noted that its victims were confined to 
troops in the field. It was not directed against nor did it 
affect the civilian population. This fortunate result was 
aided by the fact that the airplane was not used as a 
means of disseminating gases. Despite the escape of the 
civilian population in World War I it was fear for their 
safety from gas that preoccupied the states in the inter-
war period.38 
 
B. Law and Reactions 
 
1. Law Addressing Submarine Warfare 
 
The 1899 Hague Conference had addressed the emerging topic of 
submarines and torpedo boats. However, the Conference only voted on 
the issue of the “prohibition of submarine or diving torpedo-boats”39 and 
did not address submarine operations, assuming that law customary to 
the conduct of naval operations would apply.40 Many of the delegates 
expressed the sentiment that if the proposed ban on submarines were 
unanimous, they would acquiesce.41 Needless to say, the delegates did 
not establish a prohibition, and the law of war regarding submarines was 
not seriously taken up again until the Washington Conference in 1921. 
Thus, the law of armed conflict did not specifically address 
submarines during World War I. The market for violence was in deep 
disequilibrium. With the exceptions of hospital ships and the few 
instances in which survivors of a sinking ship were killed, “German U-
boat attacks on enemy shipping violated no international law.”42 There 
was no lack of public rancor against the atrocities committed by                                                         
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 11. 
38 Major Kelly, supra note 8, at 12. 
39 HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1899, supra note 7, at 299. 
40 TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 17. 
41 HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1899, supra note 7, at 367. German delegate, Captain Siegel, 
stated “that if all the other Governments agreed not to adopt vessels of this kind, Germany would 
join in this understanding.” Id. This of course was mooted by the delegate from France’s assertion 
“that the submarine torpedo has an eminently defensive purpose, and that the right to use it should 
therefore not be taken from a country.” Id. Contrast this serious political jostling with the pompous 
statement from the delegate from the Netherlands: “the submarine torpedo is the weapon of the 
weak.” Id. 
42 TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 13. 
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submarines, airplanes, and poison gases regardless of their status under 
international law. As Telford Taylor aptly described:  
 
[T]he enormous carnage of World War I stimulated 
public demand for measures to prevent a recurrence of 
such slaughter and destruction. Military and diplomatic 
interest was rekindled in the use of multinational treaties 
not only to limit armaments, but also to govern their use. 
The airplane, the submarine, and poison gas had 
profoundly affected the conduct of the war, and it was to 
these relatively new weapons, largely untouched by the 
Hague Conventions, that attention now turned.43 
 
Five conferences followed World War I that attempted to regulate 
submarine warfare: the Washington Naval Conference in 1921–22, 
Geneva Naval Conference in 1927, Second Geneva Naval Conference in 
1932, London Naval Conference in 1930, and the Second London Naval 
Conference in 1935. Intuitively, the fact that these conferences occurred 
shows that there was an overproduction of violence. Additionally, the 
state parties involved attempted to use the force of law to raise the cost of 
submarine warfare and thereby reduce the externalities of its use. 
The Washington Conference involved nine nations, seven treaties, 
and thirteen resolutions.44 The general purpose of each treaty was to 
“prevent the possibility of another war” and engage naval competitors in 
negotiations. 45  During the course of the Conference, British delegate 
Lord Balfour called for the prohibition of the submarine, reasoning: 
 
Is there any man who doubts that if they are once let loose to 
deal with merchantmen their powers will not in the stress of 
war be abused in the future as they have been so grossly 
abused in the past? I do not think, as I have already 
indicated, that it is the fighting use of the submarine which is 
really before us now. The question before use now is 
whether you are going to encourage an instrument of war 
which, if it be encouraged, if indeed it be permitted at all, 
will undoubtedly be used in the illegitimate destruction of 
commerce.46 
                                                         
43 Id. at 18 
44  NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT OF 1921 VII 
(1923) [hereinafter WASHINGTON CONFERENCE OF 1921].  
45 The Washington Naval Conference 1921-1922, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, U.S. DEPT. OF 
STATE, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/naval-conference (last visited Nov. 26, 2014); 
WASHINGTON CONFERENCE OF 1921, supra note 44, at 1. The Invitation to the Conference read: “It 
may also be found advisable to formulate proposals by which in the interest of humanity the use of 
new agencies of warfare may be suitably controlled.” Id. 
46 WASHINGTON CONFERENCE OF 1921, supra note 44, at 73–74. 
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Balfour drew upon the recent memory of German U-boat attacks 
during the war. His reasoning reflected Great Britain’s strategic 
vulnerability to blockade. France’s delegates stringently opposed the 
proposal and this led to an impasse.47 The British Empire delegation 
made one last legal argument and had it formally placed on the record of 
the Conference, “[T]he use of submarines, whilst of small value for 
defensive purposes, leads inevitably to acts which are inconsistent with 
the laws of war and the dictates of humanity, and the delegation desires 
that united action should be taken by all nations to forbid their 
maintenance, construction, or employment.” 48 , 49  This statement is 
similar to Human Rights Watch’s call for a ban on “killer robots,”50 and 
essentially advocates the use of law to tax submarines out of existence. 
Notwithstanding the failure of the Conference to come to a consensus 
on submarines, the Five-Power Treaty was signed by the United State, 
Great Britain Japan, France, and Italy.51 It required the countries to: limit 
themselves to a set ratio of warship tonnage; reduce the size of their 
navies by scrapping older ships; and outlawed expansion of bases in the 
Pacific.52 These treaties expired in 1936.53  
The Geneva Naval Conference in 1927 was called by U.S. President 
Calvin Coolidge to address classes of vessels not addressed by the Five-
Power Treaty in 1921. 54  These classes of vessels included cruisers, 
destroyers, and submarines.55 The parties failed to form a treaty due to 
U.S. and British disagreement over cruiser limitations. 56  The Second 
Geneva Naval Conference formed a part of the League of Nations World 
Disarmament Conference, which also failed when Hitler withdrew 
Germany from the Conference and the League of Nations in October 
1933.57  
                                                        
47 Id. at 54. “France believes that the submarine is the only weapon which at present permits a 
nation scantily supplied with capital ships to defend itself at sea. For France, therefore, the 
submarine is an essential means of preserving her independence which she can not give up . . . .” Id. 
48Id. at 93. 
49 HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1899, supra note 7, at 283, 328. Captain Mahan made a 
similar argument—though unconvincingly—in the 1899 Hague Conference. Id. The Conference 
reports: “[H]e thinks . . . it is no more cruel to asphyxiate one’s enemies by means of deleterious 
gases than with water, that is to say, by drowning them, as happens when a vessel is sunk by the 
torpedo . . . he does not deem it logical to permit the use of submarine and submergible boats and to 
prohibit the use of shells filled with asphyxiating gases.” Id. 
50 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 3, at 3. 
51 OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, supra note 45. 
52 WASHINGTON CONFERENCE OF 1921, supra note 44. 
53 TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 18. Perhaps the treaties limited tenure is why Taylor refers to them 
as a failure. 
54 The Geneva Naval Conference 1927, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/geneva (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57  Edwin L. James, GERMANY QUITS LEAGUE; HITLER ASKS 'PLEBISCITE'; Berlin 
Orders Delegates to Leave Arms Conference as Britain and France Veto Rearming of Reich, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 15, 1933, at E1, available at 
http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F40D1EFE395B137A93C7A8178BD95F478385F9. 
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The London Naval Conference in 1930 was a new attempt to revise 
and extend the terms of the Five Power Treaty of 1922 and avoid a naval 
arms race.58 Specifically, a Joint Statement of the President of the United 
States and the British Prime Minister on October 10, 1929 expressed the 
purpose of the Conference “not only to review the conversations on a 
naval agreement . . . but also to discuss some of the more important 
means by which the moral force of our countries can be exerted for 
peace.”59 The tone of the Conference was one of establishing peace in 
light of the then-recent Kellogg-Briand Pact, but the terms of the treaties 
were much more pragmatic.60 
It limited the tonnage of auxiliary ships, granted the Japanese a higher 
ratio of tonnage for non-offense ship categories, and ended the impasse 
on cruiser vessels that ended the first Geneva Naval Conference.61 All of 
the provisions of the treaty except Article 22 were set to expire 31 
December 1936.62, 63 Article 22 required submarines to follow the same 
standards of international law as applied to surface vessels. Specifically, 
the following are accepted as established rules of International Law: 
 
(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, 
submarines must conform to the rules of 
International Law to which surface vessels are 
subject. 
 
(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal 
to stop on being duly summoned, or of active 
resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether 
surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render 
incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without 
having first placed passengers, crew and ship's 
papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the 
ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety 
unless the safety of the passengers and crew is 
assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, 
by the proximity of land, or the presence of another 
vessel which is in a position to take them on board.64 
 
                                                        
58 LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE OF 1930, supra note 7, at 7. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 210–11.  
61 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, supra note 54. 
62 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1930 
(2013), available at https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/london-naval-conf. 
63 Id. In 1935, the United States, Great Britain, Japan, and France met to renegotiate the 
Washington and London Treaties before they expired the following year. Japan withdrew from the 
Conference and the remaining powers agreed to a six-year moratorium on building large light 
cruisers.  
64 LONDON CONFERENCE OF 1930, supra note 7, Part IV art. 22, at 73–4. 
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This article of the 1930 London Treaty became known as the London 
Submarine Protocol of 1936, and over 35 nations eventually subscribed 
to it. 65, 66 Subsection two directly addressed the issue of unrestricted 
submarine warfare. 67  Notwithstanding these protections, “German 
submarines frequently sunk British and other merchant ships without 
warning” during World War II.68 Balfour had been prophetic in 1921.69 
No measures of law or accountability had reigned-in the new technology. 
 
2. Concerning Aerial Bombardment 
 
Delegates in the1899 Hague Peace Conference were among the first 
to address aerial bombardment.70 The call for a conference began with a 
circular written by Count Mouraviev on behalf of Tsar Nicholas II. It 
began with a list of eight proposals, with the third proposal being the 
“prohibition of the discharge of any kind of projectile or explosive from 
balloons or by similar means.71, 72 Thus, the original question presented 
to the Conference was whether there was a need to proscribe “the 
discharge of projectiles or of any explosive from balloons or by similar 
methods?”73  
In response, United States delegate, Captain Crozier, suggested a 
moratorium of five years rather than an indefinite prohibition. He argued 
that a moratorium of five years would be more appropriate because: 
 
The present balloons cannot serve effectively in war. 
Moreover, their use for the purpose in question would 
neither be humane nor in accordance with the spirit 
which guides us, since it is impossible to foresee the 
place where the projectiles or other substances 
discharged from a balloon will fall and since they may 
just as easily hit inoffensive inhabitants as combatants, 
or destroy a church as easily as a battery. However, if it 
were possible to perfect aerial navigation in such a way 
as to do away with these defects, the use of balloons 
might decrease the length of combat and consequently 
the evils of war as well as the expenses entailed thereby . 
. . . At a later stage of its development, if it be seen that 
it’s less desirable qualities still predominate, there will                                                         
65 Major Kelly, supra note 8, at 107. 
66 TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 87, 400. During the Nuremberg Trials, Admiral Karl Doenitz was 
prosecuted for unrestricted submarine warfare (among other things) in violation of this precedent. 
67 Id. Though this was not a sufficient deterrent to Nazi Germany or the United States in the 
Pacific theater. 
68 Id. at 399. 
69 WASHINGTON CONFERENCE OF 1921, supra note 44, at 73–4. 
70 Parks, supra note 18, at 10. 
71 Id. at 8. 
72 HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1899, supra note 7, at xviii. 
73 Id. at 275. 
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still be time to extend the prohibition; at present let us 
confine our action within the limits of our knowledge.74 
 
This proposal showed foresight. Perhaps unwittingly, Captain Crozier 
had proposed a five-year period during which the technology could grow 
and a suitable equilibrium could be deduced. The delegates supported the 
proposition and it became Declaration IV, 1 of the Convention, “The 
Contracting Powers agree to prohibit, for a term of five years, the 
launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons, or by other new 
methods of a similar nature.”75 
The Second Hague Conference of 1907 saw a renewal of the 
moratorium on aerial bombardment. However, the prohibition was “until 
the next Peace Conference” instead of a set number of years.76 Neither 
Germany, Russia, nor France signed the declaration.77 Furthermore, the 
outbreak of World War I interrupted the scheduled Third Hague 
Conference and made the prohibition unenforceable as to the remainder 
of nations. Thus, there were fewer restrictions to aerial bombardment 
when World War I began. The rules of land warfare applied to aerial 
bombardment in at least in one sense: undefended cities and towns were 
still non-targetable.78 However, London was not technically undefended 
and, therefore, the zeppelin raids of World War I violated no laws of 
war.79  
In the interwar period, there were no further treaty developments on 
aerial warfare. The Washington Conference concluded “that it is not at 
practicable to impose any effective limitations upon the numbers or 
characteristics of aircraft, either commercial or military.”80 Furthermore, 
the committee stated:  
 
[T]he use of aircraft in war should be covered by the 
rules of warfare as adapted to aircraft, by a further 
conference which should be held at a later date. . . . The 
late war had revealed the imperative necessity for the 
adoption of new rules of warfare, and that these new 
rules of warfare should be framed so as to take into 
account the development of the science of aeronautics 
and its application to war.81 
 
A committee met as per Resolution I of the Conference, but the 
Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare drafted were never presented to the                                                         
74 Id. at 275, 354. 
75 THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907 220 (James B. Scott ed., 
1918).  
76 HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1907 vol. I, supra note 11, at 67, 85–86. 
77 THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907, supra note 75, at 237. 
78 TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 13. 
79 Id. 
80 WASHINGTON CONFERENCE OF 1921, supra note 44, at 229. 
81 Id. at 229. 
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international community for official acceptance or discussion.82 Thus, 
aerial warfare continued to operate largely under only customary 
international law through both World Wars.83 This was the equivalent of 
states stating that the new weapon system did not lower the cost of 
warfare (or increase strategic advantage) and that no accountability 
measures were necessary. 
 
3. Prohibition of Asphyxiating Gas 
 
Gas warfare was deemed impracticable during the 1899 Hague 
Conference. Captain Mahan of the United States delegation stated, “The 
question of asphyxiating gases is still intangible, since projectiles of this 
kind do not really exist.” 84  However, the Conference committees 
considered how they might be used. Russian delegate, Captain Schiene, 
considered gases “barbarous in character and . . . [the] equivalent of 
poisoning a river.” 85  Danish delegate Bille concurred, stating “[I]f 
directed against a besieged city, they would perhaps hit more harmless 
inhabitants than the ordinary projectiles.”86 The potential externalities of 
the hypothetical weapon were immediately apparent. 
All of the delegates to the Conference agreed that asphyxiating gases 
would be prohibited if there was unanimity on the issue. All delegates 
agreed to the prohibition except the delegates from the United States and 
Great Britain. The U.S. delegate stated his reasons thus: 
 
(1) The objection that a warlike device is barbarous has 
always been made against new weapons, which have 
nevertheless eventually been adopted. In the middle ages 
firearms were accused of being cruel; later on an attack 
was made against shells, and still more recently against 
torpedoes. It does not seem demonstrated to him that 
projectiles filled with asphyxiating gases are inhuman 
and useless cruel devise, and that they would not 
produce a decisive result. 
 
(2) He is the representative of a nation which is actuated by 
a keen desire to render war more humane, but which 
may be called upon to make war, and it is therefore                                                         
82 HOWARD S. LEVIE, TERRORISM IN WAR: THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES 374 (1993); TAYLOR, 
supra note 6, at 19. “For air warfare there were no further treaty developments, and in retrospect it is 
easy to see why the 1923 draft failed to win adherents. In 1921, the Italian air general Giulio Douhet 
had published a widely read book, Command of Air, preaching the doctrine that in future years air 
power would be decisive . . . . Public opinion, during the years between the two world wars, settled 
into a fatalistic acceptance that future wars between great powers would surely involve urban 
infernos produced by bombers, and that nothing could be done about it.” TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 
19. 
83 TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 10, 20. 
84 HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1899, supra note 7, at 283. 
85 Id. at 366. 
86 Id. 
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necessary not to deprive one’s self, by means of hastily 
adopted resolutions of means which might be later on be 
usefully employed.87 
 
All other delegates at the Hague Peace Conference signed the binding 
declaration prohibiting the use of asphyxiating gases except for the 
delegates from the United States and Great Britain. The text of the 
declaration stated in part that those contracting powers “agree[d] to 
abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the 
diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases. . . . It shall cease to be 
binding from the time when, in a war between the contracting Powers, 
one of the belligerents shall be joined by a non-contracting Power.”88 
Thus, as a matter of strict textual interpretation, the declaration ceased to 
be binding once the United States, a non-signatory, entered World War I. 
All other uses of gas warfare prior to that time were a violation of the 
declaration. 
Despite not signing the declaration, Great Britain adhered to the 
declaration during the 1907 Hague Conference.89 The Conference held 
that the prohibition on asphyxiating gases was still in force and that there 
was no need to modify the declaration, 90  suggesting that the per se 
illegality of the weapon is perpetual until such time as a Party repudiates 
its adherence. 91 It also suggests that the potential externalities of the 
weapon are so great that the prohibition, essentially taxing it out of 
existence, had to continue. 
 
III. CONTEMPORARY ISSUES: AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS 
 
A. The Emerging Technology of Autonomous Weapon Systems 
 
Conferences and states failed to sufficiently regulate aerial vehicles, 
submarines, and asphyxiating gas in the early 20th century. Consequently, 
the international market for violence was in a state of disequilibrium and 
produced massive externalities. This brief history of submarines, aerial 
vehicles, and gas serves as a useful backdrop against which to consider 
modern developments in military technology, specifically autonomous 
weapons systems and whether they too will result in externalities of 
violence. There are hosts of current and emerging autonomous weapons 
systems, including “robots, unarmed and armed unmanned aerial and 
underwater vehicles auto-response systems such as armed unmanned 
                                                        
87 Id. at 367. 
88 THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907, supra note 75, at 225. 
89 HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1907 vol. I, supra note 11, at 86. 
90 HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1907 vol. III, supra note 11, at 98 
91 The United States has never formally adhered to the Declaration and retains reserves of 
chemical agents.  
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sentry stations.”92 While the purpose of this article is not to describe 
autonomous weapons systems in depth, a brief overview highlights 
pertinent LOAC issues. We must first begin with the definition of 
“autonomous weapons systems” by dividing that term into its parts: 
“weapons systems” and “autonomy”. 
Schmitt defines a weapon system as “a weapon and the items 
associated with its employment.” 93 For example, aircraft, submarines, 
and artillery would all constitute weapon systems. The U.S. Department 
of Defense has defined “autonomy” with regards to weapon systems as a 
weapon system that can select and engage targets without further 
intervention by a human operator. 94  This includes human-supervised 
autonomous weapon systems that are designed to allow human operators 
to override operation of the weapon system, but can select and engage 
targets without further human input after activation.95 
According to this definition, the Department of Defense recognizes 
two levels of autonomy: semi-autonomous or fully autonomous. 96  In 
contrast, Human Rights Watch suggests that autonomy of weapon 
systems ranges along a spectrum of human-in-the-loop, human-on-the-
loop, and human-out-of-the-loop.97 Currently, all autonomous weapons 
operate with a human-in-the-loop, but semi-autonomous, or human-out-
of-the-loop, capabilities are being developed. 98  Thus, currently only 
human operators of autonomous weapons systems can command them to 
target and deliver force. Human-on-the-loop capability would mean that 
the human operator merely observes but has the ability to override the 
autonomous weapon’s actions. Lastly, full autonomy,99 or human-out-of-
the-loop, would mean that the weapon system could target and deliver a 
weapon without any human interaction.                                                         
92 Eric Talbot Jensen, The Future of the Law of Armed Conflict: Ostriches, Butterflies, and 
Nanobots, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 2, 38 (forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2237509.  
93 Schmitt, supra note 3, at 3. 
94 DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 3000.09, AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS 3 (Nov. 2, 2012) 
[hereinafter DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09]. 
95 Id. at 13–14. Autonomy is a capability (or a set of capabilities) that enables a particular 
action of a system to be automatic or, within programmed boundaries, “self-governing.” 
Unfortunately, the word “autonomy” often conjures images in the press and the minds of some 
military leaders of computers making independent decisions and taking uncontrolled action. While 
the reality of what autonomy is and can do is quite different from those conjured images, these 
concerns are—in some cases—limiting its adoption. It should be made clear that human operators at 
some level supervise all autonomous systems, and autonomous systems’ software embodies the 
designed limits on the actions and decisions delegated to the computer. Instead of viewing autonomy 
as an intrinsic property of an unmanned vehicle in isolation, the design and operation of autonomous 
systems needs to be considered in terms of human-system collaboration. 
96 Id. 
97 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 3, at 2. “Human-in-the-Loop Weapons: Robots that can 
select targets and deliver force only with human command; Human-on-the-Loop Weapons: Robots 
that can select targets and deliver force under the oversight of a human operator who can override 
the robots’ actions; and Human-out-of-the Loop Weapons: Robots that are capable of selecting 
targets and delivering force without any human input or interaction.” Id. 
98 Id. at 16. 
99 DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, supra note 94, at 13. 
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Many people likely associate autonomous weapons with “drones” – 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) – due to their high-profile in the 
ongoing war on international terror networks.100 In fact, as of 2012 31% 
of all military aircraft were UAVs. Between 2002 and 2010 the 
Department of Defense’s UAV inventory increased 40-fold. 101 
Contemporary UAVs are not autonomous weapons in the strict sense.102 
Drones are remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) whereas an autonomous 
weapon is one “capable of operating in a dynamic environment with no 
human control.”103 
The Aegis and Patriot weapon systems are perhaps the most 
numerous and longest-used of the true autonomous weapon systems.104 
There are currently 74 U.S. Navy ships equipped with the Aegis Weapon 
System.105 The U.S. Navy reports that the nature of the weapons system 
allows for “simultaneous operations against multi-mission threats: anti-
air, anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare.”106 Patriot missile defense 
manufacturer Raytheon boasts that 12 countries use the system and that 
there are over 200 fire units fielded worldwide. 107  Lockheed Martin 
describes the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile as having been 
100% effective in Operation Iraqi Freedom.108 
 
The missile flies to an intercept point specified prior to 
launch by its ground-based fire solution computer, which 
is embedded in the engagement control station… Shortly 
before arrival at the intercept point, the PAC-3 Missile's 
                                                        
100 International Committee of the Red Cross, Fully Autonomous Weapons Systems (2013), 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/2013/09-03-autonomous-weapons.htm. The 
ICRC is careful to distinguish between autonomous weapons systems and UAVs: “Autonomous 
weapons” must also be distinguished from “drones”—a.k.a. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or Remotely 
Piloted Aircraft (RPA)—which are remote-controlled weapons. RPAs are typically operated and 
controlled by a crew located outside of the area of combat, composed of a pilot and a payload 
operator, and supported by a team of signals, and imagery intelligence analysts. RPAs require human 
operators to select targets and activate, direct and fire the weapons concerned. Based on the ICRC's 
understanding of the expert literature, an “autonomous weapon” is one that is programmed to learn 
or adapt its functioning in response to changing circumstances in the environment in which it is 
deployed. A truly autonomous weapon system would be capable of searching for, identifying and 
applying lethal force to a target, including a human target (enemy combatants), without any human 
intervention or control. This definition connotes a mobile system with some form of artificial 
intelligence, capable of operating in a dynamic environment with no human control.  
101JEREMY GERTLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42136, U.S. UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS 
(2012), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/77662547/1105-001. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104  UNITED STATES NAVY FACT FILE, AEGIS WEAPON SYSTEM (2013), available at 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=200&ct=2. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107  RAYTHEON, PATRIOT (2014), available at 
http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/patriot/. 
108 Id. 
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on board Ka band seeker acquires the target, selects the 
optimal aim point and terminal guidance is initiated.109 
 
Both of these weapons systems initially deployed in the early 1980s 
and have been updated since that time.110 
At least 11 states, in addition to the U.S. field the Patriot air missile 
defense system, have developed their own systems. 111 Perhaps most 
recently, Israel has developed its Iron Dome weapon system as a 
defensive weapon against rockets launched into Israeli territory. Israel 
asserts that the weapon system has had an incredible 80% successful 
interception rate. 112  The weapon system’s manufacturer, Rafael 
Advanced Defense Systems, states: “Its ability to discriminate between 
threats headed towards the defended area and those that will fall into the 
sea or open fields reduces costs and limits unnecessary interceptor 
launches.”113  
South Korean defense firm DoDAAM has been developing what it 
calls the “Super aEgis II” – a “turret-based weapon platform capable of 
locking onto a human target three kilometers away.”114 This defensive 
autonomous weapon is one of the first weapon systems to take the step 
toward semi-autonomy due to its ability to target and engage while the 
human operator observes. Israel and South Korea are only two examples 
of the over forty-four countries are currently developing military robotics 
that will almost certainly change the face of modern warfare.115,116  
All current autonomous weapons involve a measure of human 
involvement—there are no fully autonomous weapons yet. 117  Unless 
their use is prohibited, their emergence into the modern battlefield is not 
a question of “if” but “when”.118 The fact that at least 44 countries have                                                         
109  LOCKHEED MARTIN, PAC-3 MISSILE (2014), available at 
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/PAC-3.html. 
110 RAYTHEON, supra note 107. 
111 Id. 
112 Uzi Ruben, Is the Iron Dome Effective?, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 4, 2013, available at 
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/Is-the-Iron-Dome-effective-308711. 
113  RAFAEL ADVANCED DEFENCE SYSTEMS LTD., IRON DOME (2010), available at 
http://www.rafael.co.il/Marketing/186-1530-en/Marketing.aspx. 
114  South Korean “super gun” packs hi-tech killing power, REUTERS, Feb. 14, 2011, 
http://www.reuters.com/video/2011/02/14/south-korean-super-gun-packs-hi-tech-
kil?videoId=187406842. 
115  Combat Robot: Combat station and control center, DODAAM SYSTEMS LTD. (2013), 
http://www.dodaam.com/eng/sub2/menu2_1_7.php. The nature of the demilitarized zone allows for 
a reduced need for human interaction since any human target will likely be a lawful target. 
116 U.S. Army and Lockheed Martin Complete Advanced Autonomous Convoy Demonstration, 
LOCKHEED MARTIN (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/news/press-
releases/2014/january/mfc-013014-us-army-lm-complete-advanced-autonomous.html. In addition to 
these offensive and defensive weapons, there is the emerging issue of autonomous convoys, which 
introduce autonomy into the arena of logistics. 
117 DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, supra note 94, at 7. 
118 Schmitt, supra note 3, at 5. Schmitt states: “Nor are there any ‘plans to develop lethal 
autonomous weapon systems other than human-supervised systems for the purposes of local defense 
of manned vehicles or installations.’ That said, Human Rights Watch is correct in noting that this 
fact does ‘not preclude a change in that policy as the capacity for autonomy evolves.’ At some point 
in the future, such systems will find their way into the battlespace.” Id.  
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or are in the process of building military robotics shows that autonomous 
weapons are the prevailing trend.119  
 
B. Questions Raised by Autonomous Weapons Systems 
 
These weapons systems and the level of their autonomy present 
questions of law that deserve serious consideration. In fact, the United 
Nations Office at Geneva reports that “at the 2013 CCW Meeting of 
High Contracting Parties, a new mandate on lethal autonomous weapons 
was agreed on.”120 An informal meeting of experts met from 13 to 16 
May 2014 to discuss lethal autonomous weapons. The chairperson of the 
meeting released a report to the 2014 Meeting of the High Contracting 
Parties to the Convention. 121 Anti-autonomous robotics group, Article 
36, has heralded this as the first step to outlawing “killer robots”.122 
Human Rights Watch asserts that fully autonomous weapons systems 
will never be able to comply with the fundamental LOAC principles of 
distinction, proportionality, and military necessity.123 They also raise the 
issue of accountability, as if to say that accountability is impossible.  
They also assert that autonomous weapons systems run afoul of 
Martens Clause because they run counter to the “dictates of public 
conscience”. 124  They cite the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as 
support that the Martens Clause is customary international law, but 
international courts do not operate under common law tradition, and their 
opinion is non-binding on other courts and non-parties.125 Rather, “the 
clause applies only in the absence of treaty law” since “[t]he text of the 
clause refers to ‘cases not covered by this Protocol or by other 
international agreements.’”126  
Human Rights Watch’s argument is only loosely based on law. It is 
based on the false premise that their conscience as an organization                                                         
119 Steven Kanigher, Author [Peter Singer] Talks About Military Robotics and the Changing 
Face of War, LAS VEGAS SUN, March 17, 2011, available at 
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2011/mar/17/military-robotics-and-changing-face-war/. 
120 U.N. Office at Geneva, Disarmament: Lethal Autonomous Weapons, May 13–16, 2013),  
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/6CE049BE22EC75A2C1257C8D00513E26?O
penDocument (last visited Nov. 25, 2014). 
121 Id.  
122 Press Release, Article 36, States take first step towards curbing the threat of killer robots, 
(Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.article36.org/press-releases/states-take-first-step-towards-curbing-the-
threat-of-killer-robots/. 
123 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 3, at 1. The publication contains very few actual legal 
arguments. Rather, it is an appeal to conscience with a legal flavor. Its clear audience is the general 
public, as demonstrated in the publication’s introductory summary: “It is time for the broader public 
to consider the potential advantages and threats of fully autonomous weapons.” Id. One gets the 
sense that Human Rights Watch is trying to scare that broader public with the phrase “the case 
against killer robots.” Id. To their credit, they conduct a review of state responsibilities under AP I 
Article 36, but at the same time neglect to mention that states already comply with weapons reviews 
and that the United States has been doing so since before AP I was signed, thus binding itself as a 
matter of state practice to what is now arguably customary international law. 
124 Id. at 25. 
125  Id. at 26. This is especially true since the publication cites only an advisory opinion: 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion 1996 I.C.J. 257, 259 (July 8). 
126 Schmitt, supra note 3, at 32; AP I, supra note 4. 
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reflects public conscience. Simply because “killer robots” violate the 
dictates of conscience of a group does not make it binding upon states as 
a matter of customary international law. If states, however, began to 
issue statements to the effect that they considered autonomous weapons 
to be illegal, then there might be a stronger case for the illegality of 
autonomous weapons based on state practice. 
Whether or not Human Rights Watch makes a compelling legal 
argument against autonomous weapons systems, the issues of military 
necessity, humanity127 (which includes distinction and proportionality), 
and accountability 128  are pressing. For instance, if a fully automated 
Reaper drone attacked a targetable individual, wounded him to the point 
of incapacitation, and then returned and killed him – who might 
responsible for this violation of GWS Articles 3, 12, and API Articles 10, 
41(2)? 129  Does the LOAC appropriately address these issues? If not, 
what course of action ought states to take?  
 
C. Contemporary Law 
 
The current LOAC regime is fundamentally different than that created 
by the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. As such, there are greater 
legal costs on developing weapons like autonomous weapons systems 
than there were on aircraft, submarines, and asphyxiating gases. This 
section provides a snapshot of applicable law to emphasize that point. 
A weapon or weapon system is legal unless it is prohibited either per 
se through international agreement or through an individual state’s 
determination.130 Under AP I Article 36 a state may determination that a 
weapon’s use would “in some or all instances be prohibited by this 
Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High 
Contracting Party.”131 The Article 36 analysis includes the basic LOAC 
principles of humanity, 132  military necessity, 133  distinction, 134  and                                                         
127 Schmitt, supra note 3, at 8. The principle of humanity refers to the “per se illegality of 
means or methods of warfare that are of a nature to cause superfluous or unnecessary suffering.” Id. 
This standard originated with the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, which prohibited “the 
employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death 
inevitable.” I.C.R.C., Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles 
Under 400 Grammes Weight, (Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868), available at 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=568842C2B
90F4A29C12563CD0051547C. 
128 Schmitt, supra note 3, at 33. In this context “accountability” refers to the human that is 
responsible for the actions of the autonomous weapon system. 
129 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL, 27–10, § 215 
(1956) (citing GWS Article 12). 
130 AP I, supra note 4. 
131 Id. at art. 36. Additional Protocol I art. 36 states, “In the study, development, acquisition or 
adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an 
obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited 
by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.” 
Id. 
132 Id. at art. 32(2); Common Articles 2 & 3. 
133 Francis Lieber, General Order No. 100, Article 16, Instructions for the Government of 
Armies of the United States in the Field (Apr. 24, 1863). 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/110?OpenDocument.; 1907 Hague IV, art. 23. 
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proportionality. 135  None of these principles actually mean anything 
without accountability structures; thus, accountability, while derivative, 
is a crucial principle. A weapon or weapon system is not unlawful simply 
because it might be used in a way that violates these principles. A 
weapon or weapons system is unlawful when it cannot be used without 
violating the principles of humanity, military necessity, distinction, and 
proportionality.  
For example, the M-16A4 service rifle136 is a perfectly lawful weapon 
to use under military necessity because it is (1) not prohibited by 
international law, (2) is “indispensable for securing the complete 
submission of the enemy as soon as possible.” 137 Additionally, the 
rifleman controls the amount of force 138  and can choose between 
semiautomatic fire (single round) or automatic fire with a burst of three 
rounds. He is accountable through his chain of command, which also 
controls his use of force. 
This otherwise legal weapon may be used in an illegal manner if used 
in violation of the principles of humanity, distinction, or proportionality. 
Expanding bullets, first addressed in the 1899 Hague Conference, 139 
illustrate how the rifle might violate the principle of humanity. 
Expanding bullets were prohibited because, although they more readily 
render combatants hors de combat, they also make it substantially more 
likely to render death inevitable.140 The principle of humanity would also 
be violated if the rifleman shot and incapacitated an enemy but then beat 
the enemy with the butt of his rifle, thereby violating GWS Art. 3. Does 
this mean that the law of armed conflict prohibits rifle butts? Certainly 
not. Rather, the manner in which the rifleman employed his weapon was 
illegal. Likewise, the rifle as a weapon does not violate the principle of 
distinction; rather, the rifleman might violate the principle if he does not 
ascertain whether an individual is targetable. Lastly, it is again the 
rifleman that controls the application of the principle of proportionality. 
Opening fire on lawful combatants mixed among a crowd of civilians 
                                                                                                                            
134 AP I, supra note 4, at art. 48 (stating “In order to ensure respect for and protection of the 
civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish 
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives 
and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.”). 
135 Id. at art. 57, 51(5)(b). “An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” Id. at 51(5)(b). 
136 As a United States Marine, the author cannot restrain himself from using his rifle as a 
primary example. 
137 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 129, at § 3. 
138  OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, CANADIAN DEFENSE FORCES, JOINT 
DOCTRINE MANUAL, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS, B-
GJ-005-104/FP-021, (Aug. 13, 2001), available at 
http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/publications/Training-formation/LOAC-DDCA_2004-eng.pdf. 
139  HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1899, supra note 7, at 276–78, 80–82; THE HAGUE 
CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907, supra note 75, at 227, “Declaration IV, 3”. 
140 THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907, supra note 75, at 79. 
Since the St. Petersburg Declaration in 1868, this propensity to make death inevitable has been 
referred to as “superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering”. Id. 
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would almost certainly violate proportionality.141 These LOAC principles 
impose crucial costs on the use of every weapon in battle such that the 
optimum level of violence is maintained. 
Autonomous weapons systems can be analyzed in much the same 
way. First, would they violate the principle of humanity by causing 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering? The answer to this question 
is the same as with the rifle. Think of the rifleman as the weapon 
system—the delivery system of violence. The bullets he fires may, if 
scored in such a way as to cause expansion, cause unnecessary suffering. 
Likewise, the autonomous weapon could potentially deliver a weapon 
that violates the principle of humanity. However, this is not the primary 
concern raised by Human Rights Watch. Rather, they assert that artificial 
intelligence can ever advance to the point where it can satisfy the 
principles of distinction and proportionality.142 In short, they argue that 
there are no workable “taxes,” no workable regulations, laws, or 
administrative costs—that can produce a LOAC-compliant weapon. This 
assertion ignores several realities—the first of which is that not even 
human intelligence has evolved to the point of a zero-error rate in 
causing superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. Additionally, the 
concepts of superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering are arbitrarily 
set by international standards.  
The second reality is a more scientific one and argues that a current 
prohibition does not take into account potential future advances in 
technology. 143 Advances in computational power are often described 
using Moore’s law. Moore’s law is the observation that the number of 
transistors on circuits doubles approximately every two years. 144 
Researchers have already begun to develop transistors that are only 
nanometers in diameter and that will serve as “building block[s] for new, 
more powerful computer memories, advanced electronic materials, and 
the basic components of quantum computers that could solve problems 
so complex that all of the world's computers working together for 
billions of years could not crack them.”145 
These advances in computational power mean that autonomous 
weapons systems may ultimately have every capability to distinguish 
“between a fearful civilian and a threatening enemy combatant.”146 In 
fact, “[i]t may well be, for instance, that weapons systems with greater 
and greater levels of automation can—in some battlefield contexts, and 
perhaps more and more over time—reduce misidentification of military                                                         
141 AP I, supra note 4, art. 51(5)(b). 
142 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 3, at 4, 24, 29. 
143 This is why the author argues for the status quo—the AP I, art. 36 paradigm. See AP 1, 
supra note 4. 
144 Excerpts from A Conversation with Gordon Moore: Moore’s Law, INTEL CORPORATION 
(2005), 
http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2012/ph250/lee1/docs/Excepts_A_Conversation_with_Gordon_Mo
ore.pdf. 
145 Super-small transistor created: Artificial atom powered by single electrons, SCIENCEDAILY, 
(Apr. 19, 2011), www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/04/110418135541.htm.  
146 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 3, at 4. 
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targets, better detect or calculate possible collateral damage, or allow for 
using smaller quanta of force compared to human decision-making.”147 
In the meantime, it is DoD policy that, “Autonomous and semi-
autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and 
operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use 
of force.” 148  Thus, DoD accountability measures and current LOAC 
provisions are appropriately imposing costs on the development of 
autonomous weapons, and thereby bring the market for violence into 
equilibrium. 
Autonomous weapons are a military necessity in our technologically 
advanced era, and the DoD continues to assess their strategic value.149 
Furthermore, “the condition that military objectives yield some military 
advantage would make any separate requirement for military necessity 
superfluous.”150 
Both the principles of distinction and proportionality hinge on 
technological advancement and safeguards built into the weapons 
systems. The DoD policy is that “Persons who authorize the use of, 
direct the use of, or operate autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon 
systems must do so with appropriate care and in accordance with the law 
of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable 
rules of engagement (ROE).”151 Additionally, every weapon system must 
go through a stringent legal review in “coordination with the General 
Counsel of the Department of Defense,”152 thus complying with AP I art. 
36. The effect of this legal review is twofold: (1) it slows down the 
implementation of new technology much like the five-year prohibition 
on aerial bombing in the 1899 Hague Convention, and (2) it imposes 
legal costs as well as additional oversight (accountability) for the new 
weapon. 
 
D. Accountability in the Age of Autonomous Weapons Systems 
 
Accountability is largely a matter of state responsibility. While there 
can be individual repercussions for both grave and simple breaches,153                                                         
147  KENNETH ANDERSON & MATTHEW WAXMAN, LAW AND ETHICS FOR AUTONOMOUS 
WEAPONS SYSTEMS: WHY A BAN WON’T WORK AND WHY THE LAWS OF WAR CAN 15 (Hoover 
Institution, 2013), available at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/Anderson-
Waxman_LawAndEthics_r2_FINAL.pdf. 
148 DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, supra note 94, at 2. There is the additional protection that “Semi-
autonomous weapon systems that are onboard or integrated with unmanned platforms must be 
designed such that, in the event of degraded or lost communications, the system does not 
autonomously select and engage individual targets or specific target groups that have not been 
previously selected by an authorized human operator.” Id. 
149  Id. at 6. “Systems will go through rigorous hardware and software verification and 
validation (V&V) and realistic system developmental and operational test and evaluation (T&E)”, 
including analysis of unanticipated emergent behavior resulting from the effects of complex 
operational environments on autonomous or semi-autonomous systems. Id. 
150 Schmitt, supra note 3, at 22; see AP I, supra note 4, art. 52(2). 
151 DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, supra note 94, at 3. 
152 Id. at 7. 
153 See Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 146, 
Aug. 12, 1949, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/380. 
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the development of autonomous weapons exposes commanders and 
operators to liability for a weapon they may not control and in whose 
development they likely had no part. Human Rights Watch asserts: 
 
If the killing were done by a fully autonomous weapon, 
however, the question would become: whom to hold 
responsible. Options include the military commander, 
the programmer, the manufacturer, and even the robot 
itself, but none of these options is satisfactory. Since 
there is no fair and effective way to assign legal 
responsibility for unlawful acts committed by fully 
autonomous weapons, granting them complete control 
over targeting decisions would undermine yet another 
tool for promoting civilian protection.154 
  
This conception of accountability depends on individual criminal 
liability to act as the primary deterrent to violations of the LOAC. The 
blanket statement that “there is no fair and effective way to assign legal 
responsibility”155 sells states short, as they certainly can, and do, put in 
place accountability structures.156  
It seems to this author that Human Rights Watch’s stronger case 
would be to increase the redundancy of accountable parties, rather than 
to assert that no one could be held responsible for a violation of LOAC 
or ROEs. Culpability at the command, operator, evaluator, and legal 
analyst level would increase the administrative costs and mean that at 
each level the weapon system would receive greater scrutiny. If instead, 
accountability is a measure of fairness, rather than redundancy, then the 
burden ought to shift from the commander and operator to the evaluator 
and attorney in the case of fully autonomous weapons. Accountability of 
necessity will remain with the commander and operator as long as there 
is human-system collaboration.157 This arrangement will likely impose 
sufficient potential costs on commanders and operators of semi-
autonomous weapons systems that will minimize negative spillovers. 
 
IV. LEARNING FROM THE PAST 
 
In a very real sense the international community has already faced 
the legal conundrum presented by new technology. The prescient Hague 
Conventions in 1899 and 1907 discussed aerial vehicles, submarines, and 
gases although each was in its infancy and were considered 
impractical.158 They demonstrated the necessity of forward thinking with                                                         
154 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 3, at 42. 
155 Id. 
156  E.g., DOD 3000.09, which places a burden on care on commanders, operators, legal 
analysis, and evaluators. 
157 See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN DOD SYSTEMS 11 (2012). 
158 HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1899, supra note 7, at 283. 
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regards to the law of armed conflict. Rather than being purely 
reactionary, states have the ability to sense the zeitgeist of technology in 
warfare and plan accordingly. 
Notwithstanding this prescience, the Hague and interwar conferences 
failed to sufficiently regulate (tax) new weapons systems or simply left 
them to customary international law. There were no real, individualized 
accountability measures until the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials that 
imposed significant costs on the market of violence. 159  The lack of 
safeguards was certainly a factor that led to the atrocities during both 
world wars. One lesson from the past is certain—leaving the regulation 
of new technology to customary international law is a poor solution for 
weapons with potentially large spillover effects. 
Part I provided historical examples that highlight the distinction 
between per se illegality of weapons and unlawful use of weapons. The 
submarine was first thought to be incapable of humane use because it 
would have to forfeit its strategic use, concealment, to escort the 
captured vessel to port. 160  Lord Balfour emphasized that unrestricted 
submarine warfare was, in his opinion, inevitable. Indeed, German U-
boat sank merchant and hospital ships. However, the submarine itself 
was a tool that could be used in such a way as to not cause unnecessary 
suffering, could target appropriately, and whose sailors could perform an 
appropriate proportionality assessment. Captain and crew could be held 
accountable. In fact, Lieutenant Patzig and his subordinate officers, 
Lieutenants Dithmar and Boldt were each charged during the Liepzig 
trials. 161  Admiral Karl Donitz was similarly charged during the 
Nuremberg trials and served a ten-year sentence.162 States finally found 
the appropriate level of legal and accountability taxation on the 
submarine through trial and error. 
Like submarines, aerial vehicles were not illegal per se after the 
Hague Conferences but were subject to a five-year moratorium because 
they ran afoul of the principles of distinction and proportionality.163 As 
Captain Crozier aptly stated in the 1899 Conference, “[T]heir use for the 
purpose in question would neither be humane nor in accordance with the 
spirit which guides us, since it is impossible to foresee the place where 
the projectiles or other substances discharged from a balloon will 
fall.” 164  The moratorium expired. The maneuverability of aerial craft 
increased such that they could choose legitimate targets. That ability to 
control the craft and its targets would have also allowed for                                                         
159 International criminal law serves the role of signaling to the international market of violence 
that it is not in equilibrium. 
160 TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 17. This was the burden under customary international law. See 
also INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, MANUAL ON THE LAWS OF NAVAL WAR, 
(1913), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/1913a.htm. 
161 TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 17. The inefficacy of the Leipzig Trials is indisputable. However, 
the fact remains that there were clear notions of who should be held accountable. 
162 Id. at 616. 
163 THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907, supra note 75. 
164 HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1899, supra note 7, at 275. 
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accountability of pilots and crew had there been any international rules 
governing aircraft.165 Through World War II, no real costs scaled back 
the devastating potential of aerial warfare. The externality persisted.  
Asphyxiating gases were made per se illegal in 1899 Hague 
Declaration IV, 2.166 Gas succeeded as perhaps no other weapon ever in 
placing men hors de combat. In battle gas was proven effective and it 
appropriately targeted opposing forces, never having incidentally 
affected civilians. 167  Thus, proportionality was not an issue. Once 
released, however, the gas could not discriminate targets. It violated the 
principle of humanity by inflicting superfluous and unnecessary suffering 
as witnessed then by the civilian population as droves of permanently 
disabled soldiers returned home. Delegates to the 1899 Conference 
compared its hypothetical use to poisoning a river. 168  The potential 
indiscriminant use of gas against civilians persuaded the delegates to 
prohibit gas completely.169 They attempted to tax it out of existence by 
making it per se illegal.  
As with the case of asphyxiating gas, the LOAC of the past 
addressed each emerging technology individually. This was perhaps one 
of the early legal regime’s greatest failings because it was reactionary. 
Because each new technology would have to be addressed individually 
the damage would likely have already been done. The modern LOAC 
paradigm has built upon this failure in timing and addresses the 
development of weapons generally, i.e., through AP I art. 36. Attempts to 
address individual technologies at the international level through specific 
treaties have often been onerous and contentious, such as the Ottawa 
Treaty on anti-personnel mines.170 Instead, AP I, art. 36 acts as a tax on 
future weapons systems in a proactive attempt to find the correct 
equilibrium of violence. This modern paradigm has its historical 
analogue in the 1899 Hague Conference when Captain Crozier reflected 
on balloons, “At a later stage of its development, if it be seen that it’s 
less desirable qualities still predominate, there will still be time to extend                                                         
165 Parks, supra note 18. 
166 THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907, supra note 75, at 224. 
Interestingly, the declaration states: “The contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of 
projectiles the sole purpose of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases . . . it shall 
cease to be binding from the time when, in a war between the contracting Powers, one of the 
belligerents shall be joined by a non-contracting Power.” Id. In 1907 Great Britain adhered to the 
declaration, but the United States never did. Thus, gas warfare in Europe before the entrance of the 
United States was illegal, but legal once the United States had entered the conflict. This is not to 
suggest that the United States could act with impunity, but rather that as early as 1899, and certainly 
earlier in the St. Petersburg Conference, reciprocity was the main enforcement mechanism of LOAC. 
167 Major Kelly, supra note 8, at 11. 
168 HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1899, supra note 7, at 295–6, 366.  
169 Id. at 366. 
170  CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND 
TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION, 18 Sept. 1997, available at 
https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/580; Felicia Schwartz, U.S. Moves Closer to Compliance With 
Treaty Banning Land Mines, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2014, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-s-moves-closer-to-compliance-with-treaty-banning-land-mines-
1411509618. 
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the prohibition; at present let us confine our action within the limits of 
our knowledge.”171 
 
V. THE EQUILIBRIUM OF VIOLENCE: LOAC THROUGH AN ECONOMIC 
LENS 
 
 Customary international law and treaties attempt to find the 
correct equilibrium of violence without actually engaging in armed 
conflict. The price paid to find that equilibrium in the 20th century was 
two world wars—a cost we ill can afford again. Perhaps what Human 
Rights Watch has meant to argue is that autonomous weapons systems 
have an effect on the market for violence.  It’s a policy argument, not a 
legal one.  In Losing Humanity they state, “It is time for the broader 
public to consider the potential advantages and threats of fully 
autonomous weapons.”172 Certainly they do not allude to a “rise of the 
machines” moment of singularity, but rather that with any technology 
there are always tradeoffs. 173  One of these trade-offs is that the 
monopoly on violence and the nature of warfare change as technology 
advances.  
As unsavory as it sounds, states participate in an international market 
for violence. While not all states have equal shares of that market, each is 
affected by common market shifts, including: information, technology, 
education, and capital. The introduction of technology increases a state’s 
productivity; in this case its capacity to produce violence. Technology 
has the dual ability to decrease costs of production and increase quantity 
of goods produced. Consider, for example, how the computer has 
enabled businesses to do both of those things.  Likewise, new technology 
for states decreases costs and facilitates the production of violence. The 
potential result is a negative externality: violations of the laws of armed 
conflict. However, if sufficient taxation (in the form of law and 
accountability measures) is put in place to compensate for this negative 
spillover, then the excess of violence will be scaled-back. The examples 
of technologies discussed in Part I illustrate this point.  
Following World War I, unrestricted submarine warfare was 
condemned and submarines were required to follow the rules of 
international law to which surface vessels were subject. Gas warfare had 
previously been prohibited and in future conflicts the prohibition was 
adhered to in large measure. The treaties and changes to the LOAC 
following both world wars evidence that the international consensus was                                                         
171 HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1899, supra note 7, at 354. 
172 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 3, at 1. 
173 HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1899, supra note 7, at 283, 328. It is useful at this point to 
revisit Captain Mahan’s repeated stance on prohibitions of new technology during the 1899 Hague 
Conference: “[T]he objection that a war-like device is barbarous has always been made against all 
new weapons, which were nevertheless eventually adopted. In the Middle Ages firearms were 
criticized as being cruel, and later on mortars and still more recently torpedoes received the same 
accusation.” Id. 
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that the equilibrium of violence, the optimum level of aggression, had 
been surpassed. In short, the international community recognized the 
negative externality and taxed it. The Washington Naval Treaty, the 
London Treaties, Leipzig Trials, the League of Nations, the Nuremberg 
Trials, and the Geneva Conventions were all taxes in the form of 
international law by which the victors of war sought to raise the cost of 
violence and bring the marketplace for violence to an acceptable 
equilibrium point. 
Lastly, the current legal paradigm in the form of AP I art. 36 
demonstrates the wisdom of experience. That article requires a legal 
review of the “development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon”. 
Legal reviews impose costs. These costs make it harder for states to 
produce violence, which buys precious time to address particularly 
difficult issues surrounding the implementation of new technologies like 
autonomous weapons systems. The following graph, while simplistic, 
accurately depicts the concept: 
 
Technology today in the form of autonomous weapons174 shifts the 
violence production frontier out, but law and accountability taxes can 
maintain the equilibrium at an acceptable level. The analogue to this 
economic framework is in Michael Schmitt’s response to Human Rights 
Watch: “[T]he question becomes whether international humanitarian law 
provides sufficient safeguards with respect to the use of these weapon 
systems.” 175  If the LOAC does not serve as a sufficient tax on 
autonomous weapons systems, then regardless of their conformity with 
the principles of humanity, distinction, and proportionality the quantity 
of violence will increase.                                                          
174 Autonomous weapons are only a fraction of the new technologies that are transforming the 
nature of armed conflict and ultimately the LOAC. For an in-depth review, see Jensen, supra note 
92. 
175 Schmitt, supra note 3, at 14. 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 Of necessity, violations of the LOAC are remedied after an 
abuse has occurred. This is much like any other market; equilibrium 
points are determined over time by repeated market failure. These 
failures indicate to actors, in this case states, what their choices should 
be. However, the threat of culpability on states and combatants imposes 
costs as well. Thus, there are both safeguards before and after an 
unlawful action occurs. 
 If states act under the assumption that autonomous weapons 
systems (like any technology shock) by definition produce an externality, 
there are additional measures they can take that would act as a tax and 
which would prevent a surplus of violence. They can increase costs by 
expanding the number of people accountable for the function of 
autonomous weapons systems. It is clear that commanders and operators 
will have only limited control over future weapons. Thus, the new 
technology will require new accountability structures. The author 
recommends that those involved at the development and verification of 
systems stage share liability with attorneys that conduct the legal 
analyses of new weapons and commanders that order the weapons use. 
By creating redundant accountability measures and linking their tasks, all 
groups must work together to ensure that autonomous weapons systems 
comply with the law of armed conflict and that they preserve the 
equilibrium of violence.  
Of course, this solution may not sit well with Human Rights Watch 
and other like-minded groups. It depends on state responsibility. It 
depends on the institutional memory of states regarding the failed market 
of violence during the early 20th century. Members of the Human Rights 
Watch may be deceiving themselves. Even a prohibition is no guarantee 
that autonomous weapons systems will not be used in future conflicts.176 
If anything, a prohibition redistributes the costs actors pay for using 
autonomous weapons such that they only pay for their use after a 
violation. The current paradigm imposes costs during development and 
after a violation. Thus, a prohibition is actually much more difficult to 
manage than the imposition of legal costs. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
States are actors in the international market for violence. They 
produce violence, a negative externality, and new technology decreases 
the cost of violence and increases the quantity produced if left 
unchecked. The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conferences addressed new 
technologies of the day—aerial vehicles, submarines, and asphyxiating 
gases—so as to appropriately regulate their use and arrive at an                                                         
176 E.g., asphyxiating gas. 
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acceptable equilibrium of violence. The delegates’ failure to do so 
resulted in massive externalities in warfare. 
 
The modern law of armed conflict addresses new technology 
generally through the broad scheme in principles customary international 
law and AP I art. 36, which serve as a tax on autonomous weapons 
systems. By following this paradigm states avoid the pitfall of attempting 
to address each new technological development individually. 
Autonomous weapons systems deserve our caution through over-taxation 
by careful legal analysis and additional accountability measures. 
Accountability is at the state’s discretion but is an essential operational 
cost in order to maintain the equilibrium of violence. Because we do not 
know where the true equilibrium point is and because the risk of 
externality is high, states ought to err on the side of caution by increasing 
costs. 
